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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
f/'Yise No

900268

vs.
MILLS JOHNSON,

Pi ior i. t v 2

Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

ARGUMENT
.1 ssue 1 ,
WHILE RULE OF PRACTICE 3.6(c) HAS BEEN SUPERSEDED, THE
PROCEDURE FOR TAKING GUILTY PLEAS ENUNCIATED IN STATE v GIBBONS
WAS BASED ON RULE 11 OF THE UTAH RULES OF PROCEDURE WHICH REMAINS
INTACT. THE REQUEST FOR REMAND IS CONSONANT WITH THIS COURT'S
POLICY OF ALLOWING TRIAL JUDGES TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS
AN ALLEGED ERROR.
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The Plaintiff complains that the Defendant has failed to cite
to the record in support of his allegation that the trial court
failed to determine a factual basis for the entry of his guilty
plea.

The Defendant, in his Statement of the Case, has cited to

the record a discussion that an affidavit was prepared but then
not used. [Plea Trans. 2:12-19].

The required statement of facts

is not contained at that location, nor at any other location in
pages

1-29

of

the Plea Transcript.

To provide

a more

exact

location for something that does not exist is quite difficult.

It

may be presumed that if the Plaintiff could have located any such
Statement or Synopsis, she would have pointed it out.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that to remand the case due to the
invalid procedure would somehow exceed this court's
This court did so in Gibbons

authority.

"...consonant with the policy of

allowing trial judges to have the opportunity to address an alleged
error."(at

1312).

This

court

should

exercise

its

inherent

supervisory power in the same way in this case to correct an
obvious violation of its mandated procedure

for acceptance of

guilty pleas.

Issue II.
THE DEFENDANT HAS CITED TO THE RECORD BUT SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO
SUPPLEMENT THAT RECORD OR HAVE THE MATTER REMANDED FOR A HEARING
IN THE INTEREST OF JUDICIAL ECONOMY.

Despite

this

court

having

denied

Defendant's

Motion

To

Supplement The Record with his affidavit, his letter to Judge Low

dated January 1, 1990 [Exhibit H, Brief of Appellant] is among
2

those documents in the record that has been cited by the Defendant
in his Statement Of The Case.

In that letter, he requests the

court to change his attorney.

His first attorney "has been too

busy to give this case any priority at all. He has given me wrong
advice, withheld critical information from me...."

While the

Defendant would have the ability to provide a more extensive record
if he was left to post-conviction relief after this appeal, it
would be in the interest of judicial economy for this court to
reconsider its denial of Defendant's Motion To Supplement The
Record to give flesh to his complaints in his letter of January 1,
1990 and/or permit the defendant to make such a record in the
District Court on this issue in connection with a remand as to
Issue I.

Issue III.A.
ANY FAIR READING OF THE TRIAL COURT'S COMMENTS REQUIRES THE
CONCLUSION THAT IT HAD DETERMINED AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT A
STEPFATHER IN A COMMON LAW MARRIAGE WAS PRECLUDED FROM
CONSIDERATION FOR PROBATION UNDER UTAH CODE 76-5-406.5.
It is clear from Mary Ann's letter to Judge Low dated September
18, 1989, that she regarded the Defendant as her
husband and the stepfather of her daughter, the alleged victim.
However, due to the trial court's ruling as a matter of law, the
factual basis for the common law marriage was not explored or
determined.

Indeed, at the sentencing hearing, the State

appears to concede the fact that a common law marriage exists.
The state did not argue that a common law marriage did not exist
but only that the legislature would have had to specify a common
3

law step-parent if it had meant to include such.

If they intended for anybody who has been—if they
intended, for an example, a common law situation, they
could have called for that. I submit that the language
here suggests a natural parent, a biological parent or
a step-parent by a legal guardian by legal proceedings
and not the contrary.
[Sent.Trans.34:12-18]
Although the trial court made no finding nor entered any order
regarding the validity of the common law marriage, there would have
been ample support for the finding.

Page 8 of the Presentence

Report, included in the record, indicates that he and Maryanne
started living together on June 24, 1982, that this relationship
remains intact, and the next page examines in detail the sexual
history of this relationship. Page 4 of the attached psychological
evaluation

specifically

refers

to

this

relationship

as

the

Defendant's third marriage. The Presentence Report itself, though
once referring to the alleged victim as Jennifer Berthal [p.2], and
her mother as Mary Anne Berthal Johnson [p.8], usually refers to
the girl and her mother by the last name of Johnson, [p.8,11,13].
But for the implied stipulation of the parties that a common-law
marriage

existed,

and

the

erroneous

ruling

that

such

were

statutorily precluded from consideration, there is a substantial
likelihood that all the elements of a common-law marriage would
have been established.

Issue III.B.
THE ONLY EVIDENCE ON THE ISSUE OF SEVERE PSYCHOLOGICAL HARM,
THAT THERE WAS NONE, WAS UNREBUTTED.
4

Plaintiff complains that there is no cite to the record in
support of

Defendant's allegation that there was no severe

psychological harm. Defendant has amply cited letters to the judge
from the alleged victim and her mother, part of the record, in his
Statement Of The Case. [p.7].

That evidence was unrebutted.

Defendant's point was and remains that the trial court not only
abused its discretion but also committed an error of law by
creating an unrebuttable presumption, "that this kind of abuse
cannot but substantially harm psychologically and emotionally the
victim." [Sent.Trans.46:7-10].

Issue III.C.
IN ADDITION TO EXERCISING ITS INHERENT POWER TO REQUIRE MORE
FROM THE STATE THAN AN UNSUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATION OF ABUSE OF
ANOTHER VICTIM, THIS COURT SHOULD FIND THAT THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT DID NOT SUSTAIN HIS
BURDEN OF PROOF.
Plaintiff agrees that this court has inherent supervisory power
over judicial processes to ensure that the judicial processes are
not abused, to protect the fundamental integrity of the judicial
branch, and most important, seeing that justice is done.

The

evidence presented by the state, vague and contradictory statements
by a 3 1/2 year old girl after being apprised by her mother of
"Uncle Mill's problem", made during a period of her own parents'
separation, and thoroughly rebutted by the Defendant's wife and

their daughter, was so speculative that to place the burden upon
the Defendant to disprove it was unfair and unjust.

In addition,

the contradictions of the statements, as to whether her parents

5

were present, whether the single alleged touching was over or under
her clothes, whether her brother was present, and whether it
occurred in her old or new home, were so inherently untrustworthy
that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the
Defendant had not sustained his burden of proof.

Issue III.D.
DEFENDANT HAS AMPLY CITED TO THE RECORD IN HIS STATEMENT OF
THE CASE. THE COURT HAS NOT ONLY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BUT HAS
ERRED IN SETTING A STANDARD WHICH FEW IF ANY DEFENDANTS COULD
SATISFY.
Defendant has cited to the record in his Statement Of The Case
both as to the nature, frequency,and duration of the conduct on
page 6 and the issue of acceptance into a treatment program on page
10.

The

court

abused

its discretion by

not

accepting the:

daughter's recantation of her initial statements to the police anc:
her explanation for the same. If the judge accepted the daughter's;
corrected statement, in her letter to the judge, that such conduct
had occurred eight times in three years but still refused tc:
consider probation, this would present a standard which few if any
family abusers could ever meet to qualify for probation.

The;

standard set by the trial court in this case goes beyond what could
have been contemplated by the legislature.

Issue IV.
EVEN THOUGH THIS COURT HAS DECLINED TO PERMIT THE DEFENDANT TO
SUPPLEMENT THE RECORD AS TO INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL,
DEFENDANT HAS SET FORTH AMPLE BASIS IN THE RECORD TO DEMONSTRAT 2
THAT HE RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE.
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This court has denied the Defendant's motion to supplement the
record with his affidavit which was submitted as exhibit A and to
which

was

attached

a

letter

containing

some

very

specific

instructions to his attorney, few if any of which were done prior
to or at the time of sentencing.

This court has also declined

Defendant's motion to obtain and provide to this court evidence
from his trial attorney's disciplinary proceedings later that year
showing substantial medical problems that were interfering with his
ability to render competent legal assistance.

Nevertheless, the

record is still sufficient to show the ineffectiveness of counsel.
In his letter to the trial judge postmarked April 7, 1990, and
among the documents that are in the record in this case, [Exhibit
I, Brief of Appellant],

the Defendant states:

Judge Low, I am Mills Johnson. I am writing you out of
fear for the well being of my family as well as my own
future. The delay of my sentencing has been a tremendous
strain on my wife and daughter. If it had been necessary
at all it would have been at least easier to tolerate.
This case should have been over no later than November.
When I was told that I had to waive my right to the 30
day limit, I had no idea I was sentencing myself at the
same time.
Your honor, I know you have heard many
excuses explaining why this case is still pending, but
there is only one reason that holds water. The steps
necessary to gather the evidence for the hearing you
requested simply have not been taken. This case has been
set aside and all but forgotten.
I even wrote a
checklist of the things we needed to do for the new
Public Defender and to date I know of none that are done.
Today marks day #252 that I have been incarcerated. . .
The omissions revealed by the transcript of the preliminary
hearing

are manifest.

Despite having the burden

of proof,

Defendant's attorney did not present any testimony or affidavits
of either the Defendant or his wife or his daughter but instead
7

relied entirely on the letters that the wife and daughter had
written to the judge.

This omission fell below the objective

standard of reasonable professional judgment. This is demonstrated
by the fact that the trial judge, despite the letters of both the
wife and the daughter, found that the defendant had not sustained
his burden of proof.
As to the issue of common law marriage, counsel, despite the
implied stipulation of the parties, should have explicitly provided
to the court through testimony or affidavits all of the factual
basis for its existence and requested from the court a ruling
thereon.

There cannot be any strategic basis for this omission.

As to the issue of severe psychological harm to the victim, no
request was made to the court for funds or an order for the
psychological testing of the defendant.

If the trial court was

correct in creating a virtually irrebuttable presumption of severe
psychological harm that could be overcome only by expert testimony,
counsel's

failure to secure that evaluation or to ask for a

continuance to secure that evaluation can have no strategic basis.
As to the allegation of a second victim, there is no indication
in the record that counsel ever attempted to secure a court order
for an independent evaluation of the 3 year old girl.

Given the

substantial penalty at stake, there can be no strategic basis for
this omission.

Nor can there be a strategic basis for counsel's

failure to provide testimony or affidavits of the Defendant, his
wife, or his daughter as to the information that the wife and
daughter provided in their letters.
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As to the nature, frequency, and duration of the conduct and
defendant's acceptance into a treatment center, no reason is
revealed in the record for counsel's failure to arrange for the
testimony of Defendant's wife and daughter rather than relying
solely on their letters.

At a minimum, either affidavits could

have been obtained or a conference call with the trial judge could
have been requested and arranged.
can be

a

strategic

basis

It does not appear that there

for this

failure.

Indeed

as is

demonstrated by Defendant's April 7 letter to the judge, there was
simply a failure to provide effective assistance of counsel.
That counsel's performance prejudiced the Defendant is also
clear.

Qualification for probation and the avoidance of the

minimum mandatory sentence is dependant on counsel's obligation to
present to the court sufficient evidence to sustain Defendant's
burden of proof.
While the Defendant is well aware of his right to petition for
post-conviction relief once he has exhausted this appeal, the
failures and omissions that are presently evident from the current
record are so substantial that this court can and should find that
the Defendant was provided ineffective assistance of counsel.

CONCLUSION
This Court should remand to permit the Defendant to withdraw
his

guilty pleas, or

in the alternative, remand

sentencing hearing.
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for a new

Respectfully submitted this 30th dciy of September, 1991.

Nathan Hult
Attorney for Appellant
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General,
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Judith

S.
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Assistant Attorney General, 236 State Capital, Salt Lake City, UT
84114, on the 30 day of September, 1991.

Nathan Hult
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